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ABSTRACT
In every state except Montana, at-will employment is
the default rule, leaving employers free to discharge
employees for their use of social media. The National
Labor Relations Act’s (NLRA) protection of collective
action, however, is emerging as a substantial limitation to
at-will terminations. In Hispanics United of Buffalo, the
National Labor Relations Board concluded that Facebook
posts critical of the non-profit employer were protected as
collective action and that the employer’s retaliatory
termination of five employees violated Section 8 of the
NLRA. To be protected as collective action under the
NLRA, an employee’s use of social media must be
“concerted,” somehow involving other coworkers, and for
the purpose of mutual aid. The employee may lose this
protection if her words or conduct are opprobrious,
insubordinate, or disloyal as to disrupt the work
environment. Furthermore, an employer remains free to
terminate the employee for other legitimate reasons
unrelated to collective action. Finally, an employer may not
distribute or enforce a social media policy which chills or
potentially chills collective action.
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INTRODUCTION
Social media permeates the American workplace. Access to
social networks has expanded through the use of cell phones,
personal computers, netbooks, work stations, and every device in
between. Employees use these platforms to communicate with
their coworkers, manage projects, send data, organize
presentations, and accomplish tasks related to their employment.
Employees also use these platforms to harass, complain, and
slander their employer, potentially threatening a company’s good
will, culture, reputation, and bottom line.
Unsurprisingly, harassment, complaining, and slander can
serve as a basis for termination. Unless otherwise negotiated, atwill employment is the default rule, and employees may be
terminated for their use of social media. However, if an
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employee’s use of social media constitutes collective action under
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), she may be protected
from termination.
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has applied
existing legal concepts to emerging issues concerning social media
use. In analyzing whether an employee’s use of social media is
protected, the NLRB still determines whether there is concerted
activity and whether an employee is fired in violation of the
NLRA. Generally, “[t]he legal principle that insubordination,
disobedience or disloyalty is adequate cause for discharge is plain
enough.” 1 In extending its traditional protections for collective
action to social media, the NLRB has looked to established legal
principles and case law. As described in the 1953 case NLRB v.
Local Union No. 1229, IBEW, “The difficulty arises in determining
whether, in fact, the discharges are made because of such a
separable cause or because of some other concerted activities
engaged in for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection which may not be adequate cause for discharge.” 2
With social media, whether an employee was terminated for
collective action or some other independent reason remains a
nuanced determination of fact.
This Article will first outline, in Section I, the controlling
law for establishing collective action and determining whether
protection has been lost. Section II will enumerate and analyze
cases in which the employees’ conduct was deemed concerted
activity. Section III will examine cases where the employees’
actions fell outside the scope of the NLRA’s protection.
Section IV discusses how employers can use precedent to
create a viable social media policy. The Article concludes with
practice pointers for both employers and employees.
I. THE BLACK LETTER LAW: PROTECTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE
ACTION UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
Because the NLRA’s statutory language does not address use
1
2

NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, IBEW, 346 U.S. 464, 475 (1953).
Id.
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of social media, the NLRB has applied existing case law
addressing employees’ right to engage in concerted activity to
decide emerging issues associated with social media use. Section 7
of the NLRA states that “[e]mployees shall have the right to selforganization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” 3 Section 8 of the Act
enforces these rights by prohibiting employers from engaging in
unfair labor practices. Namely, an employer may not “interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in Section 7.” 4 Consequently, to be protected under the
NLRA, an employee’s action must be (1) concerted and (2) for the
purpose of mutual aid or protection.
Concerted activities include those “engaged in with or on the
authority of other employees, and not solely by and on behalf of
the employee himself,” 5 as well as those made by “individual
employees seek[ing] to initiate or to induce or to prepare for group
action.” 6 Mutual aid and protection refers to the underlying
purpose of the Act to allow “employees to band together in
confronting an employer regarding the terms and conditions of
their employment.” 7
This protection can be lost if the employee’s conduct is
opprobrious, insubordinate, or disloyal to the point of disrupting
the work environment. 8 To determine whether an employee has
lost NLRA protection, the NLRB has distinguished between an
employee outburst made to the employer (or supervisor) and those
made to third parties, such as the press or general public. 9 For
outbursts made against or to a supervisor, the NLRB applies a
3

National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
Id. at § 158(a)(1).
5
Meyers, 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 497 (1984).
6
Meyers Inds., Inc. (Meyers II), 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 887 (1986).
7
NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 835 (1984).
8
NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, 346 U.S. 464, 475 (1953); Atlantic Steel
Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816-817 (1979); Will & Baumer Candle Co., Inc., 206
N.L.R.B. 772, 774 (1973).
9
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, NLRB, REPORT OF THE ACTING
GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES (2011).
4
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four-factor balancing test to determine whether an employee has
crossed this line, considering: “(1) the place of the discussion; (2)
the subject matter of the discussion; (3) the nature of the
employee's outburst; and (4) whether the outburst was, in any way,
provoked by an employer's unfair labor practice.” 10 For outbursts
directed to third parties, the NLRB analyzes whether the outburst
is protected as “part of an appeal for support in the pending
dispute,” or whether the outburst constitutes an unprotected
“separable attack purporting to be made in the interest of the public
rather than in that of the employees.” 11
With Facebook and Twitter, the relevant legal issue is still
whether the employee engaged in collective action for the purpose
of mutual aid, and subsequently, whether such protection is lost
based on the severity of the employee’s conduct. The following
sections will discuss key cases from the recent Report of the Acting
General Counsel Concerning Social Media Cases, and the
underlying facts and reasoning in cases where the employee’s
conduct was held to be protected as concerted activity under the
NLRA. 12
II. EXAMPLES OF DISCHARGES PROHIBITED BY THE NLRA
In determining whether an employee’s use of social media is
protected under the NLRA as concerted activity, the NLRB
focuses its inquiry on the two main elements of collective action:
activity that is (1) group-related and (2) for mutual aid.
Recognizing the potential utility for employees to organize with
and through social media, the NLRB hinges protection on whether
the employee’s actions related to previous or prospective group
10

Atlantic Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. at 816 (1979).
Local Union No. 1229, IBEW, 346 U.S. at 477; OFFICE OF THE GENERAL
COUNSEL, NLRB, REPORT OF THE ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING
SOCIAL MEDIA CASES 8-9 (2011).
12
On August 18, 2011, Acting General Counsel for the NLRB released to
the public its REPORT OF THE ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL
MEDIA CASES (2011) to discuss “emerging issues concerning the protected
and/or concerted nature of employees’ Facebook and Twitter postings, the
coercive impact of a union’s Facebook and YouTube postings, and the
lawfulness of employers’ social media policies and rules.”
11
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activity related to terms or conditions of employment. In the
following cases, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held that
the employees’ conduct was protected as collective action under
the NLRA.
A. Prospective Collective Action: Facebook Discussion of
Employment Terms and Conditions
The clearest example of protected collective action using social
media is Hispanics United of Buffalo, 13 where an ALJ held that an
employee’s Facebook post and subsequent comments from
coworkers were protected as concerted activity. Hispanics United
of Buffalo (“HUB”) employee Mariana Cole-Rivera posted on
Facebook, “Lydia Cruz, a coworker feels that we don't help our
clients enough at HUB. I about had it! My fellow coworkers how
do u feel?”14 Some of Cole-Rivera’s fellow coworkers responded
by commenting on the post, asking questions and voicing
support. 15 The next day, the acting manager fired five employees
for disloyalty, citing the Facebook conversation as the reason. 16
In satisfying the concerted element, the ALJ explained that
“[i]ndividual action is concerted so long as it is engaged in with the
object of initiating or inducing group action . . . . The object of
inducing group action need not be express.” 17 Cole-Rivera’s
express request for opinions from her coworkers met this standard.
With respect to mutual aid, the ALJ reasoned that complaints about
terms and conditions need not be first directed to a supervisor or
the employer. 18 Furthermore, exchanges among only coworkers
13

Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., No. 3-CA-27872, 2011 WL 3894520,
at *10 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Sept. 2, 2011).
14
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, NLRB, REPORT OF THE ACTING
GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES 3-5 (2011); Hispanics
United of Buffalo, Inc., No. 3-CA-27872, 2011 WL 3894520, at *9 (N.L.R.B.
Div. of Judges Sept. 2, 2011).
15
Hispanics United of Buffalo, 2011 WL 3894520, at *10.
16
Id. at *12.
17
Id. at *16 (citing Whittaker Corp., 289 N.L.R.B. 933 (1988) and
Mushroom Transp. Co., Inc., v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964)).
18
Id. (citing Aroostook Cnty. Reg’l Ophthalmology Ctr., 317 N.L.R.B. 218,
220 (1995) enf. denied on other grounds 81 F. 3d 209 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
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were deemed sufficient to warrant protection, even if the intent to
change conditions is not apparent. 19 Finally, the ALJ concluded
that the employees had not lost protection due to opprobrious
conduct. 20
B. Outgrowth of Collective Action: Facebook Criticisms of
Employer’s Event
In Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 21 an employee criticized his
employer (a car dealership) for providing meager food and
beverages for a sales event. The employee’s critical photos and
accompanying comments on Facebook were protected because
they were “a direct outgrowth of the earlier discussion among the
salespeople that followed the meeting with management.” 22 Based
on this conclusion, the NLRB found the employee’s lone conduct
was protected as the logical outgrowth of collective action. 23
In terms of mutual aid and protection, the NLRB found the
employee’s Facebook comments and photos of an event directly
influenced the sales staff’s commissions and livelihoods. 24 In
addition to the photos and critical comments posted on Facebook
about the sales event, the employee also posted online photos and
comments about a crashed vehicle at a nearby competitor. 25 The
NLRB concluded that this latter conduct did not relate to mutual
aid or protection and did not constitute collective action. 26 Thus,
there existed an independent basis for termination. Because the
employee was fired for inappropriately mocking a competitor, the
NLRB held that the termination did not violate the NLRA. 27
This case indicates that an employee’s use of social media must
first stem from prior action, or relate to prospective collective
19

Id.
Id. at *20-21 (citing Atlantic Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816 (1979)).
21
No. 13-CA-46452, 2011 NLRB LEXIS 554, at *8 (Sept. 28, 2011).
22
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, NLRB, REPORT OF THE ACTING
GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES 8 (2011).
23
Karl Knauz Motors, 2011 NLRB LEXIS 554, at *22.
24
Id. at *5.
25
Id. at *10.
26
Id. at *27.
27
Id. at *35.
20
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action, to be protected under the NLRA. Secondly, the use must
relate to mutual aid or protection. Lastly, the use of social media
cannot be so opprobrious that protection is lost. While “collective”
and “mutual aid or protection” are read broadly, this analysis and
protection under the NLRA does not extend to independent reasons
for discharge.
III. EXAMPLES OF UNPROTECTED EMPLOYEE CONDUCT
The NLRB explicitly notes the employer’s legitimate interest
in preserving confidential information and managing good-will,
reputation, and customer relations. The NLRA does not protect
employee actions that do not relate to group activity or pertain to
terms or conditions of employment. Protection is not warranted if
either of these elements is not satisfied. Even in cases of protected
collective action, statutory protection can be lost through disloyal
or disallowed behavior. In line with this reasoning, the following
cases provide examples where the NLRB found that the
employee’s conduct was not protected as collective action.
A. Employee’s Activity Was Neither Concerted nor for Mutual Aid
In Lee Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Arizona Daily Star, a reporter
posted on Twitter that “[t]he Arizona Daily Star's copy editors are
the most witty and creative people in the world. Or at least they
think they are.” 28 A week later, a managing editor told the
employee that he was “prohibited from airing his grievances or
commenting about the Daily Star in any public forum.” 29
Thereafter, the employee continued to use his social media account
to post such comments as, “You stay homicidal, Tucson,”
“What?!?!? No overnight homicide? WTF? You’re slacking
Tucson,” and “Hope everyone’s having a good Homicide
Friday.” 30 The NLRB concluded that the reporter was terminated
for these latter comments. The tweets 31 neither related to the terms
28

No. 28-CA-23267, 2011 NLRB GCM LEXIS 17, at *4 (Apr. 21, 2011).
Id. at *5.
30
Id. at *5-6.
31
“Tweet” refers to a comment published on Twitter, which is then
29
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and condition of his employment nor sought to involve other
employees in employment-related issues. 32 Therefore, the
comments were not protected under the NLRA. 33
B. Mere Reference to Terms and Conditions of Employment is Not
Concerted Action
In the Report of the Acting General Counsel Concerning Social
Media, general counsel for the NLRB noted a case where a
bartender criticized the employer’s tipping policy on Facebook. 34
Although the terminated employee had a conversation with a
coworker a few months prior, neither that conversation nor the
Facebook post was an outgrowth of former or prospective action. 35
The bartender’s post did not constitute collective activity because
it was not an outgrowth of the conversation with the coworker and
did not relate to any meeting involving other employees or
management. 36
C. “Individual Gripes, Not Concerted Activity”
An employee’s post of “Wuck Falmart! I swear if this tyranny
doesn't end in this store they are about to get a wakeup call because
lots are about to quit!” was not protected under the Act. 37 The
NLRB noted that nothing on the record, including supportive
comments from coworkers, tied the posts to prior or subsequent
group activity. 38
viewable by followers of the account. Twitter, https://support.twitter
.com/articles/15367-how-to-post-a-twitter-update-or-tweet# (last visited July 25,
2012).
32
Lee Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Arizona Daily Star, No. 28-CA-23267, 2011
NLRB GCM LEXIS 17, at *4 (Apr. 21, 2011).
33
Id.
34
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, NLRB, REPORT OF THE ACTING
GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES 14 (2011).
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Walmart, No. 17-CA-25030, 2011 NLRB GCM LEXIS 34, at *1-2 (July
19, 2011).
38
Id.
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These cases seem to indicate that the NLRB is less concerned
with whether the employee used social media than with the
underlying purpose of those actions. 39 Independent of social media
use, the NLRB looks to whether an employee’s conduct satisfies
the elements of collective action. Because the relevant conduct is
not collective in nature, most Facebook firings or Twitter
terminations in the course of business are beyond protection under
the NLRA.
IV. SOCIAL MEDIA POLICIES THAT DO NOT CHILL SECTION 7
ACTIVITIES
One concern with social media is that every employee has the
ability to represent the business online, independent of the
employer’s wishes or control. In response, many employers create
guidelines and disseminate a social media policy. Employers must
proceed carefully to ensure that such policies do not chill, or even
potentially chill, collective action activities. 40
An employer’s guidelines constitute an unfair labor practice if
“the rules would reasonably tend to chill employees in the exercise
of their Section 7 rights.” 41 Both explicit as well as implicit limits
on employees’ Section 7 rights to collective action are unlawful. 42
The NLRB notes in its report on social media cases:
First, a rule is unlawful if it explicitly restricts
Section 7 activities. If the rule does not explicitly
restrict protected activities, it is unlawful only upon
a showing that: (1) employees would reasonably
construe the language to prohibit Section 7 activity;
(2) the rule was promulgated in response to union
39

See generally OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, NLRB, REPORT OF THE
ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES (2011).
40
The N.L.R.B.’s Office of the General Counsel recently released an
internal memorandum regarding social media policies, including multiple
analyses and examples. MEMORANDUM OM 12-59 (May 30, 2012), available
at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d4580a375cd.
41
Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. 824, 825 (1998).
42
Martin Luther Mem’l Home, Inc. (Lutheran Heritage), 343 N.L.R.B. 646,
647 (2004).
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activity; or (3) the rule has been applied to restrict
the exercise of Section 7 rights. 43
This rule advises employers to be cautious and specific in drafting
social media policies, but more importantly to be tactful and
deliberate when enforcing or invoking the policy.
The language of a social media policy cannot be phrased so as
to discourage protected activity. 44 Even after drafting an
enforceable social media policy, an employer must look to the
specific facts of an incident to determine whether wielding that
policy would restrict collective action. 45 But the NLRB
acknowledges that employers do have a legitimate interest in
preventing the disclosure of confidential information and
maintaining order and discipline in the workplace. 46 The following
cases illustrate the limitations to an enforceable social media
policy.
A. Social Media Policy Too Restrictive
Without naming the case, General Counsel for NLRB
discussed in his report an employer’s blogging and Internet policy
that prohibited employees from making disparaging remarks about
the company or supervisors or depicting the company in the media
without permission. 47 The NLRB held that this social media policy
was too broad and thus unenforceable. 48 Citing University Medical
Center, 49 the NLRB found the first policy unlawful because it
“contained no limiting language to inform employees that it did not
apply to Section 7 activity.” 50 The second policy concerning media
43

OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, NLRB, REPORT OF THE ACTING
GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES 12 (2011).
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Rafael Gely and Leonard Bierman, Social Isolation and American
Workers: Employee Blogging and Legal Reform, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287,
312 (2007).
47
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, NLRB, REPORT OF THE ACTING
GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES 6 (2011).
48
Id.
49
335 N.L.R.B. 1318, 1320-22 (2001).
50
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, NLRB, REPORT OF THE ACTING
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depictions unlawfully prevented employees from posting pictures
of protected activities. 51
B. Heated Language Still Protected as Concerted Action
General Counsel for NLRB’s report also discussed an
employee handbook containing a rule against inappropriate
discussions about the company, management, or coworkers. 52 The
employer invoked this rule to terminate an employee for Facebook
posts that used foul language to criticize the employer’s
administration of state income tax. 53 The NLRB found this policy
and the discharge unlawful because it “could reasonably be
interpreted to restrain Section 7 activity.” 54 Although the heated
language was not a response to any unfair labor practice, the
NRLB found that the place, subject manner, and nature of the
outburst favored the terminated employee. 55 The NLRB was
particularly disapproving of the employer’s use of litigation as a
threat. 56 Because the policy could potentially chill collective
action, the NLRB found the policy unlawful. 57
C. Violation of Employer’s Code of Conduct
In Rural Metro, 58 a dispatcher criticized her employer and the
allocation of federal grants in response to a Facebook post made by
her United States Senator. In her post, she referenced an incident
“where the volunteer fire fighters/first responders didn't even know
how to perform CPR,” disclosing information considered
confidential by the employer according to the terms of its code of

GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES 6 (2011).
51
Id. at 10.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 10-11.
54
Id.
55
Atlantic Steel, 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816 (1979).
56
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, NLRB, REPORT OF THE ACTING
GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES 10 (2011).
57
Id. at 11.
58
No. 25-CA-31802, 2011 NLRB GCM LEXIS 30, at *1-2 (June 29, 2011).

2012]

FACEBOOK FIRINGS AND TWITTER TERMINATIONS

41

ethics and business conduct policy. 59 Again, although the post
referred to terms and conditions of employment (wages in this
case), the post did not relate to previous or prospective collective
action and was therefore not protected under the act. 60 Because of
this, the NLRB found that the violation of the employer’s policy
was an independent reason for termination that did not violate the
NLRA. 61
CONCLUSION
For an employee’s use of social media to be protected under
the NLRA as collective action, it must be concerted and made for
the purpose of mutual aid or protection. In the context of social
media, a post, blog, or tweet is concerted if it relates to prior or
prospective collective action. However, if the employee’s use of
social media is sufficiently opprobrious, protection under the
NLRA is lost. An employer remains free to terminate for other
legitimate reasons unrelated to collective action. Lastly, an
employer may not distribute or enforce a social media policy
which chills or potentially chills collective action.
PRACTICE POINTERS


Both employers and employees should utilize privacy
settings as a means of limiting conversations with
coworkers when appropriate.



Employers should clearly delineate work and non-work
social media accounts and their use.



If utilizing social media for the purpose of collective action,
employees should make deliberate use of privacy settings.



As a general rule, online rants against an employer are
unlikely to qualify for protection as collective action.

59

Id. at *2.
Id. at *3.
61
Id. at *4.
60

42
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